25.06.2019
Головна » 2019 » Квітень » 13 » The 'Siri Thesis' and THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
00:42
The 'Siri Thesis' and THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA

The "Siri Thesis" and THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA

When man then wills or chooses something in conformity with right reason for an object or an end of which right reason approves, and of which all the accompanying circumstances accord with right reason, the act willed or chosen by man is a good act?

Yes; then, and then only, is man's act a good act. If on any one of these counts whatsoever man's act is not conformed with right reason it ceases to be a good act, and it becomes in a less or great degree, as the case may be, a bad act (XVIII.-XXL). (CATECHISM OF THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" of Saint Thomas Aquinas)

The new Siri theorists claim that during the papal conclave of 1958, Giuseppe Cardinal Siri was elected the Pope on the first day of the conclave, October 26, and took the name “Gregory XVII”.

They say if Siri had resigned, it would have been invalid according to Canon 185 of the 1917 Code of Canon Law, which states:

"Renuntiatio ex metu gravi, iniuste incusso, dolo aut errore substantiali vel simoniace facta, irrita est ipso iure."

"Resignation made out of grave fear that is inflicted unjustly or out of malice, substantial error, or simony is invalid by the law itself.”

The theorists argue that Cardinal Siri, was actually elected the Pope in 1958, but that his election was suppressed, leading to the election of Angelo Roncalli, who became “John XXIII”. They say that Cardinal Siri remained the "true Pope" until his death in 1989, but was "impeded" from serving as a Pope.

Trying to justify Cardinal Siri’s public heretical actions, they appeal to St. Thomas Aquinas, saying:

“St. Thomas Aquinas teaches in order to constitute a genuine [true] act of the will: the act must be performed spontaneously [freely] -without constraint or force- (and that) man can be coerced or forced to do something against his will in two ways: by violence and by fear (VI. 4, 5,6). That which is done under exterior violence is wholly involuntary (VI. 5).”

But the problem is that they extracted few words of St. Thomas Aqunias himself, and mixed them together with own narrow one side interpretation.

Without an attempt to offend or to “demonize” Cardinal Siri we have stated the true facts which the new Siri theorists have intentionally avoided:

  • Cardinal Siri said the new mass;
  • he ordained in the new rite;
  • he consecrated in the new rite;
  • he recognized all of the Vatican II “popes” as true popes;
  • he delivered a speech as the Archbishop of Genoa, on November 1, 1958, at the end of the religious service celebrated in his Cathedral of St. Lorenzo recognizing the elevation of “John XXIII” to the “papacy”;
  • he issued a short pastoral letter to the parishes of his Novus Ordo Archdiocese preparing them to welcome “John Paul II” for his visit to Genoa in September 1985;
  • he concelebrated the new mass with “John Paul II” in Genoa during the "papal" visit in 1985;
  • he signed all of the documents of the “Vatican II”;
  • he refused to support the traditional movement in any fashion.

If this is offensive, it is still the truth and needs to be told so that people can decide for themselves where they stand. All aforementioned actions of Cardinal Siri show that he acted without any external force, without violence or fear, by his free will. All those Cardinal Siri’s acts are the evidences that he was not a Pope.

Working voluntary hand by hand with four Vatican II "popes" he was guilty of a spiritual destruction of millions Catholic souls.

Please see St. Thomas Aquinas’s genuine teaching that shows us that Cardinal Siri made his free choice to act publicly as a Novus Ordo heretic; all his aforementioned actions were not conformed with right reason, were bad demeritorious acts, i.e. sinful, and therefore, he is answerable for those acts.

Fr. Valerii

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA":

Sixth Article,

Whether Fear Causes Involuntariness Simply?

Reply Obj. 2. Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever be added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but things that are such relatively, vary according as they are compared with different things. For what is big in comparison with one thing, is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were absolutely; but also for the sake of something else, as it were relatively. Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing, from becoming voluntary when compared with another. (1)

CATECHISM OF THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" of Saint Thomas Aquinas:

VI. - OF WHAT IS IMPLIED IN A HUMAN ACT FOR IT TO BE A GOOD MERITORIOUS ACT, OR A BAD DEMERITORIOUS ACT; AND OF MERIT AND DEMERIT IN GENERAL

(A)

Is it possible to say by what means man on earth and in this life can prepare himself, by way of merit, to receive from God some day in token of reward the beatific vision in which consists man's eternal happiness?

Yes, this he can merit solely by his acts (VI., Prologue).

Of what kind of acts is there question?

Of virtuous acts.

What is meant by "acts of virtue"?

They are those "acts which man performs by his own free will in conformity with God's will under the action of grace" (VI.-CXIV.).

What is necessary that man's acts should proceed from his will?

It is necessary that he perform them spontaneously and with the knowledge that he is their cause (VI. 1-8).

What is meant by saying that he must perform them spontaneously?

It is meant that he must perform them without constraint or force (VI. 4, 5, 6).

How can man be coerced or forced to do something againsthis will?

Man can be coerced or forced to do something against his will in two ways: by violence and by fear (VI.4,5,6).

What is understood by violence?

By violence is understood a force exterior to man which fetters his members and impedes him from actingas he wills, or makes him do exteriorly what his will rejects (VI. 4, 5).

Whatis understood by fear?

By fear is understood an interior movement which makes man will a thing he would not otherwise will,but to which he consents in the present circumstancesin order to avoid some evil that threatens (VI. 6).

Is that which one does under violence wholly involuntary?

Yes, that which one does under exterior violence is wholly involuntary (VI. 5).

Why under "exterior" violence?

Because sometimes the word "violence" is taken to signify the internal movement of anger.

In this case and in the case of other interior movements which excite or incline the will may one also speak of involuntariness?

No, in these divers cases one may not speak of involuntariness unless perchance these interior movements be so vehement as to deprive man of the use of his reason (VI. 7).

And when one acts through fear, is the act also involuntary?

When one acts through fear the act is voluntary, but with it there is an admixture of involuntary in this sense, that that which is done is indeed willed, but it is willed with reluctancy and by reason of some evil from which man shrinks (VI. 6).

(B)

It has also been said that for man's acts to be voluntary they must be done with knowledge of what is being done?

Yes; and this means that if one performs an act, without the knowledge of what one is really doing, the act done is not voluntary (VI. 8).

Is such an act then involuntary?

Yes, provided that if one knew the true facts, one would not have performed the act (VI. 8).

Can that which one does or which one does not owing to ignorance or to some error, be nevertheless sometimes voluntary?

Yes; it is always so if one is responsible for one's ignorance or one's error (VI. 8).

And when is one responsible for one's ignorance or one's error?

When one wills these directly, or when they are the outcome of culpable negligence (VI. 8).

(C)

Must not one take into account the circumstances which accompany a human act, since upon them depends so much the character of the act?

Yes; and nothing is more important than the weighing of the circumstances of a human act in order to appreciate its true value (VII. 1, 2).

Is it possible to enumerate these circumstances?

Yes, these circumstances are those of person, of object, or of effect produced, of place, of motive, of the means employed, and of time (VII. 3).

What is meant by these different circumstances?

These different circumstances bear on the character or condition of the person who acts, on what he does, or on what results from his act, on the place where he does the act, on the end for which he acts, on those things which he uses as means, and on the time when he acts (VII. 3).

Which is the most important of these circumstances?

It is the motive for which a person acts or the end which he has in view when he acts (VII. 4).

Is it always the will which produces human acts?

Yes, it is always the will; sometimes the will only; at other times it is some other faculty or even the exterior members of the body, but alwavs under the impulse and by order of the will (VIII.-XVII.).

(D)

The will of man then is the central point of all those acts that constitute his life as a rational beings and have direct hearing upon the reward of his life which is the winning or the losing of the happiness of heaven?

Yes, the will of man is the central point of all those acts that constitute his life as a rational being, and have direct bearing upon the reward of his life which is the gain or the loss of the happiness of heaven; and this implies that the act of a human being is of no account except in so far as it proceeds from the will; whether it be the will itself that produces the act, or whether the will move some other faculty of the soul or even member of the body to produce the act (VIII.-XXI.).

Of all the interior acts of the will which is the most important and the one which is the root of responsibility in man?

It is the act of choosing or "choice" (XIII. 1-6).

Why has the act of choosing or ''choice" this importance?

It is because this act effects that the will fixes with full knowledge and after deliberation upon some determined good, which it accepts and makes its own in preference to any other (XIII. 1).

Is choice properly speaking the act of the free will?

Yes (XIII. 6).

It is then by the choice that he makes with regard to all things that man derives his true moral character and his real value in view of the gain or the loss of his eternal happiness?

Yes, it is by the choice that he makes in regard to all things that man derives his true moral character and his real value in view of the gain or the loss of his eternal happiness.

How is choice divided as regards man's true character and moral worth in view of the gain or loss of his eternal happiness?

It is divided into "good choice" and "bad choice" (XVIII.-XXI).

What is a "good choice"?

It is one that bears upon a good object, in view of some good end, and as regards which all the accompanying circumstances are good (XVIII.-XIX.).

(E)

Whence is derived the goodness of an object, of an end, and of the circumstances?

This goodness is derived from the relation that all these things have with right reason (XIX. 3-6).

What is meant by right reason?

By this is understood the reason enlightened by all the lights that come from God, or which at least is not knowingly at variance with them.

When man then wills or chooses something in conformity with right reason for an object or an end of which right reason approves, and of which all the accompanying circumstances accord with right reason, the act willed or chosen by man is a good act?

Yes; then, and then only, is man's act a good act. If on any one of these counts whatsoever man's act is not conformed with right reason it ceases to be a good act, and it becomes in a less or great degree, as the case may be, a bad act (XVIII.-XXL).

What is a bad act called?

A bad act is called a "fault" or a "sin" (XXI. 1). (2)

References:

(1) THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"
OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
PART II
(FIRST PART)
LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY
FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN PROVINCE
FIRST NUMBER
(QQ. I.— XLVIII.)
TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS
1. Of THOSE Acts which are Proper to Man
VI. OF VOLUNTARINESS AND INVOLUNTARINESS, p. 99, 100
R. & T. WASHBOURNE, LTD.
PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
AND AT MANCHESTER, BIRMINGHAM, AND GLASGOW
BENZIGER BROTHERS: NEW YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO
1914
Nihil Obstat: Fr. INNOCENTIUS APAP., O.P., S.T.M.. Censor Theol.
Imprimatur: EDUS. CANONICUS SURMONT, Vcarius Generalis.
Westmonasterii.
APPROBATIO ORDINIS.
Nihil Obstat:
Fr. VINCENTIUS McNABB, O.P., S.T.B..
Fr. W. LEO MOORE. O.P., S.T.L.
Imprimatur.
Fr. HUMBERTUS EVEREST. O.P., S.T.B., Prior Provincialis Angliae
In Festo S. P. DOMINICI,
die 4 Aug., 1914.

(2) CATECHISM OF THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"
of Saint Thomas Aquinas
For the Use of the Faithful
BY R. P. THOMAS PEGUES, O.P.
MASTER IN THEOLOGY
MEMBER OF THE ROMAN ACADEMY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF ST. THOMAS AT THE COLLEGIO ANGELICO, ROME
NOW REGENT OF STUDIES AT ST. MAXIMIN, FRANCE
ADAPTED FROM THE FRENCH AND
DONE INTO ENGLISH BY AELRED WHITACRE, O.P.
London
Burns Oates & Washbourne Limited
28 Orchard Street W I 8-10 Paternoster Row EC 4
And at Manchester, Birmingham, and Glasgow
1922
NIHIL OBSTAT: F. Thomas Bergh, O.S.B., Censor Deputatus.
IMPRIMATUR: Edm. Can. Surmont, Vicarius Generalis.
Westmonasterii, Die 8 Junii, 1922.
p. 60-64

Категорія: Articles in English | Переглядів: 85 | Додав: